Skorzeny Speaks

"The Most Dangerous Man in Europe", Otto Skorzeny, actually wrote memoirs, Skorzeny’s Special Missions. He’s best known for being behind the paratrooper rescue of Mussolini in September 1943, as well as "Operation Greif", the famous Battle of the Bulge operation wherein German soldiers, dressed as American troops, infiltrated behind US lines causing all sorts of confusion and trouble. I’m not sure why he was called "dangerous", as he didn’t seem personally dangerous to anyone, and his own operations had limited scope and effect. But his story is certainly interesting. Here are the high points:

 1. Born in 1908, died in 1975, from Vienna, Austria. His name is pronounced "Skor-Tseny", which I had figured out without ever having heard it pronounced; yet he notes that some Germans could not pronounce it properly.

 2. He was rejected by the Luftwaffe for his age, not his size. So he joined the Waffen SS, eventually winding up in the Das Reich (2^nd SS) Division. SS men tended to make up a sizable portion of his commando units, but he recruited from the Army, Luftwaffe and Kriegsmarine as well. Their unofficial motto (not the official motto, Mein Ehre Heisst Treue (My Honor is Loyalty)) was "take it easy". Surfer/stoners in the SS? Amazing.

 3. Midway through the war, before the Mussolini rescue operation, Skorzeny was summoned to the Wolf’s Den (the HQ in the forests of East Prussia) to meet with Adolf Hitler and the other top brass of the Nazis. It was a real "we’re not worthy! we’re not worthy!" moment. At one point, Hitler had a group of German officers around him, and he solicited their opinion on Italy. Most gave various different responses, Germany’s ally, fascism, etc. Skorzeny simply said, "mein Fuhrer, I am an Austrian", and Hitler understood immediately.

 The situation in Italy was getting confused and dangerous, what with Mussolini captured by the Italian military and some of the top Italians making noises about making peace with the Allies (negotiating in Lisbon, Portugual) and switching sides. Reichfuhrer Heinrich Himmler, head of the SS, briefed Skorzeny, rattling off a long list of names and saying "loyal" or "disloyal". Skorzeny, said, "whoa, maybe I should write some of this down," and Himmler replied, "you fool! Nothing is to be written down, you have to memorize this!" So Skorzeny was thinking to himself, hey, I met the Fuhrer and Himmler today, amidst all this excitement I’d be lucky to remember one name, let alone dozens, and he wants me not to write this down?? Come on.

 4. Hitler on Mussolini. As an Austrian, Hitler had a particular contempt for the Italians in general. In Mein Kampf, he scoffed at the Kaiser for including Italy in the Triple Alliance: "what moron combined Italy and Austria-Hungary in the same alliance?" Sure enough, Italy opted out in 1914 and switched sides in 1915.

But despite this opinion of the Italians, he had warm and sincere feelings for Mussolini, who he considered his personal friend. He asked Skorzeny to rescue him, "because I owe it to him as a friend." The German-Italian alliance was motivated by ideological compatibility; Mussolini had taken power in 1922, and literally wrote the book on fascism. Hitler and Mussolini were kindred souls, even if the Italian war machine wasn’t quite up to the demanding standards of the Wehrmacht, or if their hapless exploits continually required German rescue (Greece and North Africa).

 5. At some point during the battle for the Eastern Front, Himmler got the firm idea to destroy the Soviet blast furnaces at Magnitogorsk. A quick analysis showed the operation to be completely impractical – no information existed on the facility, and even if they knew something about it, it would have been impossible to get a team there and then back. From this, Skorzeny learned "to display immense enthusiasm for any plan, however idiotic, which they put forward, and keep on reporting progress." "St Bureaucracy", as he later described it.

 6. During the 1938 Anschluss, he was responsible for defusing the situation and ensuring the takeover was bloodless. Later on, in 1944 when the Hungarians threatened to defect to the Soviets, Skorzeny planned and carried out the operation that shut that down immediately.

 7. Himmler, considering the new V1 rockets, asked Skorzeny if it would be possible to launch one from a U-boat against NYC. Himmler's take on this was: these Americans have had it so easy, the war hasn't hit them at home. If we smack them in NYC they will back off. Skorzeny started by speculating that this U-boat/V1 thing may be possible. But then he cautioned Himmler: attacking NYC would be counterproductive. FDR had been trying to convince Americans that Germany is a threat to them. Shoot a V1 into NYC and you'd simply confirm what FDR had been saying. Don't underestimate the Anglo-Saxon strain in the Americans. Like the British, their morale jumps sky-high when directly threatened – note the contemporary parallels with 9/11.

 8. He studied the Allied commandos extensively and admired Bill Donovan (OSS commander and founder of the CIA) – and was ultimately interrogated by him after the war. He saw that the Germans had their work cut out for them; while the British wouldn’t have any trouble finding French, Belgians or Dutch willing to fight against the Germans, even to risk their lives doing so, the pool of available British and Americans around Europe willing to betray the Allies was somewhat small – as was the supply of Frenchmen willing to work against the Allies who had just liberated their country.

 9. Skorzeny was briefly involved in counterintelligence in Holland, against British operatives. He loved the Sten gun, particularly the silenced variant. He met Admiral Canaris, head of the German Abwehr (military intelligence) – who he found to be VERY obtuse and inscrutable.

 10. He worked with frogmen and helped develop German midget submarines. In a way he was a German SEAL. This was in addition to jumping out of planes as a paratrooper.

 11. For Operation Greif, he had to round up Germans who spoke English. He actually only found TEN who could speak English with an American accent and pass themselves off as Americans. 30-40 spoke English fluently but with an accent (imagine Arnold Schwarzenegger in a US uniform trying to convince someone he’s not German – "no, I’m Austrian!") and the rest could say "yes" and "no" but otherwise had to keep their mouths shut. Skorzeny fails to describe his own English fluency, if any, but in any case the Fuhrer specifically forbid him from personally leading the mission, saying he was too valuable to risk losing.

 They had a difficult time getting enough Allied uniforms and equipment; one supply center sent them greatcoats, which GIs never wore, and another sent sent field jackets labelled "P.O.W.". The German soldiers wore German uniforms under the American ones: the theory was that international law only forbids enemy uniforms if you actually use your weapon, so they were instructed, if going into combat, to take the American uniform off first.

 Another problem: when it came time to find these Germans who spoke English, the brainiacs at the German High Command decided to distribute a memo throughout the entire German armed forces. "D’oh!" And of course, the Allies got wind of the plan within 8 days – yet somehow they never acted on this knowledge. The commandos caused all sorts of confusion and problems. There were rumors that Eisenhower was marked for assassination, and several US officers and men were mistakenly arrested as German spies. Skorzeny mentions that during his post-war interrogations by various Allied officers, they were convinced he was either involved in some plot to kill Eisenhower or to whisk Hitler off to some hidden location outside Berlin, possibly even outside Germany.

 When they used captured Jeeps, they aroused suspicion by carrying the full 4 men per Jeep; US practice was to only carry 3 at a time.

 He got into more trouble for this than for anything else. Yet he got the idea from the Americans, who had run operations dressed as German soldiers. And sure enough, during his war crimes trial, a British Commando officer, Yeo Thomas, testified on his behalf that the Allies had done the same thing, so he was acquitted.

 12. There is, however, a disturbing element to this book, which was written well after the war: absolutely NO mention of the Holocaust. From his own activities, Skorzeny probably had no personal involvement with the various elements of the Holocaust. But being in the SS, associated with various top level SS leaders, it’s impossible to believe that Skorzeny was unaware of what was going on. He must have known. Yet he doesn’t offer any apology, even insincere, such as "regrettably, mistakes were made."

 The closest clue, and a bad one, comes from his comments on the Nuremburg trials. He remarks that his fellow defendants – high ranking Wehrmacht officers, Nazi leaders, and SS officers – cravenly pleaded for their lives and whined that they were only following orders, instead of defending their actions. Granted that Skorzeny himself had nothing to apologize for – he was acquitted – but certainly the architects of the Final Solution had much to answer for. His comments, and complete lack of reference to the Holocaust, suggests that he personally approved of it but decided to be discreet and not offer this controversial opinion in the book.

 This spoils and stains an otherwise impressive book about an impressive figure. He was probably the most versatile and capable special ops officer the Germans had during the war. I found his own story, in his own words, to be impossible to put down.