Friday, February 20, 2009

Panzer Leader


I suppose this is a good sequel to my Rommel blog entry, as the premier German tank general of World War II, Heinz Guderian, also wrote a book.  Two books in fact, but I didn’t bother to read his pre-war book Achtung! Panzer!, instead opting for his post-war memoirs, Panzer Leader instead.  Actually, the idea for Guderian to write memoirs came from the Americans, who were extremely impressed with him after interrogating him after the war (“dude, you kicked major ass.  You should write a book!”).

 Rommel came into the tank picture fairly late in the game, only being given command of an armored unit in spring 1940 just before the attack on France.  He was never involved on the Eastern Front, which is where all the most important tank battles were fought, although his operations officer, Bayerlein (who in fact wrote several entries in The Rommel Papers) was Guderian’s in Russia before being transferred to Africa.  Guderian was involved with Germany’s tank program from the very beginning, starting with secret developments of tanks in the Reichwehr in the inter-war years. 

 I’ll spare all the details and cover the main areas.  His book starts with a brief chapter on his inter-war years (1919-1939) and he explains how they developed the panzer divisions.  Although Guderian had served in WWI and Germany did have a few A7V’s in that war, Guderian had been an infantry (signals) officer in the war. Germany had been on the receiving end of the Allies’ tank warfare, so he was determined to learn from his enemies.  He gives Liddell-Hart a good deal of credit; ironically, Liddell-Hart was pretty much ignored in his home country, England, nor did the French pay any attention to him either.  The victors, having won, decided the way they did things in WWI was good enough for the next time around.  Guderian figured the Germans needed to innovate and change things if they wanted to have a shot at beating the Allies the second time.  Part of this was concentrating tanks into panzer divisions instead of spreading them out among infantry divisions as support weapons.

 As Guderian describes it, typically terrain can be divided into three types: (1) terrain completely unfavorable to tanks, (2), terrain which is neutral, and (3), terrain which is extremely favorable to tank warfare.  The enemy has chosen to spread his tanks across all infantry units, including many in areas (1) and (2).  Guderian thought it was smarter to concentrate his tank forces in type 3, where they would have not only a terrain advantage, but also a tactical, numerical advantage despite the fact that, overall, Germany had less tanks than its opponents.  He also felt that tanks themselves should be the vanguard of the attack, not merely supporting the infantry. 

 His first taste of battle was in Poland, where his forces were involved in the northern sector, near Danzig and the Polish Corridor.  He was even able to visit Kulm, in East Prussia, where he was born.  Then, of course, he was also involved in the invasion of France.  The crossing of the Meuse, while a dangerous affair early in the campaign, nevertheless had its light moments.  Lt-Col. Balck, throwing Guderian’s own words at him (from an earlier exercise), warned his superior that “joy-riding in canoes on the Meuse is forbidden!!” 

 Then it was on to war with Russia.  In August 1941, Guderian had hoped and fought that the German forces would advance on Moscow as soon as possible, but Hitler had other plans.  The Fuhrer wanted to sweep back and take the Ukraine and Sevastopol (Russia’s “aircraft carrier to attack the oil fields in Romania”), Guderian was vetoed.

 On page 208, he describes something I have to laugh at.  “[On August 31, 1941] the 10th (Motorized) Infantry Division succeeded in crossing the Desna, to the north of Korop, but was thrown back again to the west bank by heavy Russian counter-attacks, besides being attacked on its right flank by strong enemy forces.  By sending in the very last men of the division, the Field Bakery Company, a catastrophe to the right flank was just avoided.”  Not THE Field Bakery Company??  Forget the Grossdeutschland Division, or the SS, it’s the Field Bakery Company which struck fear into the hearts of the Red Army.  Surely an elite unit.  Did they have a special counter in Squad Leader?  Red player: “Your assault engineers don’t frighten my Guards.” German player: “Oh yeah, well here’s the Field Bakery Company.  Prepare to die!”  Red player: “No!!!!”

 On a darker note, Guderian notes the German High Command (OKH) and Hitler were completely oblivious to conditions on the front: the persistent mud, the bitter cold, the petrol shortages, and the overall hardships which the average German soldier was forced to endure.  Coddled in their warm, comfy headquarters hundreds of miles behind the lines, these staff officers, and the Beloved Fuhrer, couldn’t possibly imagine the hell which the troops were going through.  Remarkably, these boneheads would neither accept the word of the generals such as Guderian who had been to the front, much less even consider going to the front themselves to see what was going on. 

 In December 1941, the offensive ground to a halt to the west, south and north of Moscow in the bitter cold, the troops too frozen to fight any more – especially since, by that point, the Russians had poured in large reinforcements, including Siberian units well-equipped for cold weather combat, whereas the German troops still did not have any cold weather uniforms – they were stuck in Warsaw.  Guderian advised Hitler that the troops should be permitted to retreat to river lines with previously prepared defenses to wait out the winter; Hitler disagreed.  Based on this disagreement, Guderian was relieved of command, and remained inactive until March 1, 1943.

 At that time he took over as Inspector-General of Armored Troops.  His two strongest recommendations:
1.  Don’t create any new units, simply refurbish the old ones to full strength.
2.  Don’t put any new tanks into combat until you have enough of them to make a full unit, and the men know how to use them.  Feeding them into combat piecemeal simply lets the enemy learn how to fight it (almost like the tank version of a vaccine). 

 Rommel.  In spring 1944, Guderian went to see the Atlantic Wall preparations, and ran into his old buddy Rommel (who I’ve described at length earlier).  Guderian was very impressed with Rommel’s track record, had very nice things to say about him, and believed Rommel deserved his reputation.  But they differed on the best way to deal with the oncoming invasion.  It’s funny – Rommel claims that Hitler agreed with the generals who believed that the German forces should be held away from the beaches, and Guderian here admits that he is one of them.  But Guderian claims that Hitler agreed with Rommel!   Go figure.

 Waffen SS.  He generally tends to be favorably impressed by the fighting ability and morale of the Waffen SS.  The Second SS Panzer Division, Das Reich, was under command of his army group in 1941, and he got along well with, and liked, its commander Paul Hausser.  He did not like Himmler, who he thought was completely incompetent as a military commander.  He was also good friends with “Sepp” Dietrich, the commander of the First SS Panzer Division Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler – when Guderian was sacked in late ’41, Dietrich came to visit him as a show of support.  Unlike Skorzeny, he actually recognized the Holocaust, condemning it but claiming extremely limited knowledge of the major details.  He also condemned as criminally stupid the ill-treatment of the Russian and Ukrainian local populations – here they had vast numbers of people who hated Stalin, and were willing to fight, even die, for the Germans against the Red Army, yet somehow the Nazis managed to screw that up, alienating these people and turning them into partisans cooperating with the Red Army in throwing the Germans out of Russia. 

 Later war role.  On July 21, 1944 – immediately after the bomb plot (see “Valkyrie”) Hitler appointed Guderian Chief of the Army General Staff.  Guderian knew something of the plot, but had kept his mouth shut and unlike Rommel had not been fingered by anyone.  He had refused to join the plot, reasoning that by that point the Allies were insisting on unconditional surrender, so anyone taking over from Hitler would be equally f**ked.  He thought the plot was half-assed and extremely poorly conceived.  Despite this, he still argued with Hitler, as one of the few generals who would talk straight to Hitler and not kiss his ass.

 Bewilderingly, with Russian troops in East Prussia, threatening Berlin, Hitler insisted on sending what few surplus units they had down to Budapest.  It turns out that Germany’s last sources of oil were in that neighborhood, now that Romania was gone and the synthetic oil plants were destroyed by Allied air raids. 

  Also, Hitler refused to allow the generals to establish fortified defense lines, especially on the German border, which might have assisted them in defending Germany from the Soviet onslaught.  His reasoning was: if we build these lines, the cowardly generals will simply retreat behind them immediately.  We don't want to give them any more incentive to retreat than they already have. 

 Finally in March 1945, Hitler couldn’t take any more, and advised him to go on vacation.  “Hitler said to me, ‘Please do your best to get your health back.  In six weeks the situation will be very critical.  Then I shall need you urgently.  Where do you think you will go?’ Keitel advised me to visit Bad Liebenstein.  It was very beautiful there.  I replied that it was already occupied by the Americans. ‘Well then, what about Bad Sachsa in the Harz?’ asked the solicitous Field-Marshal.  I thanked him for his kindly interest and remarked that I intended to choose my place of residence for myself and that I planned to pick a locality which would not be overrun by the enemy within the next forty-eight hours.”  He ended up in the Tyrol, where he was on May 10 when the Germans surrendered. 

 The remainder of his book consists of fairly candid character analyses of Hitler, Goering, Goebbels, Himmler, and other major players (except Rommel, who he had praised earlier).  I found this just as fascinating as the rest.  I can see why the Americans were so impressed with him – I certainly was. 

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